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What did we say in the 1960s and 1970s? The advice was
usually to tax more and tax better, with “better” often being
defined as coming closer to a comprehensive income tax.1Tax-
es on trade and on domestic consumption were seen simply
as necessary evils to generate the needed revenues. In most
cases, neither international nor subnational issues were taken
into account when determining appropriate tax policy.
In contrast, although the basic message currently is often
the same as it was in those earlier years—more and better—
both “more” and “better” now usually mean the value added
tax (VAT). Comprehensive income taxation is no longer an
ideal. To a considerable extent, both substantial tax progres-
sivity and, in particular, income taxes on capital are consid-
ered (1) undesirable on economic grounds (such as efficien-
cy and competitiveness) and (2) usually unattainable in
practice (for example, because of political and administrative
constraints). Capital taxation is particularly out of favor as a
result of such international concerns as competition for di-
rect foreign investment. Moreover, as discussed in PREM
Note 157, subnational tax issues also are of concern in many
countries. 
One reason that the policy advice changed is the optimal
taxation approach developed in the 1970s.2 Around the
same time, new empirical evidence began to emerge about
the sensitivity of savings and, especially, capital inflows to
taxation. The combination of new theory and better empir-
ical work led most tax experts to retreat from the previous
emphasis on imposing high marginal-rate income taxes and
to embrace taxing capital income at the same rates as labor
income. Experience with the serious administrative (and po-
litical) constraints that have persistently hampered attempts
in most countries to tax income—for example, in the form
of capital gains—has generally pointed in the same direction. 
It is fortunate from a revenue perspective that VAT came
along to save the day. In most countries, however, VAT large-
ly replaced excises and taxes on trade, with the latter partic-
ularly declining as trade became more liberalized. Although
income taxes generally continue to be significant in revenue
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declined around the world, not least because of the growing
influence of international factors. 
Tax policy recommendations and, to some extent, tax
policy realities thus have changed over the last 20 years.
Nonetheless, what might be called the fiscal component of
the “Washington consensus” has proved to be surprisingly re-
silient in that the tax policies recommended to developing
countries still largely follow the “broad-based, low-rate”
(BBLR) approach3—although now generally in the form of
a broad-based, uniform VAT and a flatter and more uniform
income tax (especially on capital income). 
Why so many countries adopted this approach is a puzzle
in some ways. It is possible, but not likely, that they were
persuaded to do so by the arguments of economists. Because
there is little evidence that anyone (other than economists)
involved in tax policy cares much about efficiency, a more
likely reason may be that this type of system fits better with
such policy objectives as growth and trade expansion than
did the previous expert consensus view favoring comprehen-
sive income taxes. Or perhaps the explanation is simply that
politically powerful interest groups now are more likely to
support—or at least to contest less vigorously—such policies
than they did comprehensive income taxation. 
Do Taxes Come with Growth?
Although it is not clear that a better tax system will increase
economic growth, it does seem clear that a bad tax system
may stifle it. For example, a summary of a report exploring
Latin America’s less-than-outstanding growth performance
in  recent  decades  concludes  that  “Latin  American  tax
regimes encourage the survival of unproductive firms, ob-
struct the growth of small and large enterprises alike, and
foster a deeply unequal and segmented business universe”
(IDB 2010, p. 5). Indeed, if bad taxes discourage growth,
perhaps one inference from the fact that the average tax ra-
tio for central governments in less-developed countries had
increased by about 24 percent (from 11.3 percent of GDP
in 1953–55 to 13.8 percent of GDP in 1966–68) might be
that their tax systems have improved over this period (Chel-
liah 1971, p. 263).
However, a more plausible inference is that richer coun-
tries tend to have higher taxes. At the beginning of this cen-
tury, for example, average tax levels were twice as high in de-
veloped countries (35 percent of GDP) than in developing
countries (17 percent of GDP). Moreover, although the level
of income in developing countries as a whole has continued
to rise in recent decades, tax levels in such countries have not
increased similarly. For example, whereas the average tax
level in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment countries rose from 30.1 percent to 35.5 percent
between 1970 and 2000, the similar ratio hardly altered for
developing countries, creeping up from 16.2 percent in the
1970s to only 17.0 percent by 2000 (Bahl and Bird 2008, p.
280). Moreover, despite the marked rise of the VAT during
this period, the balance between income and consumption
taxes in developing countries has hardly changed in recent
decades as both excise and import tax revenues have de-
clined sharply.4
Many studies have attempted to explain the marked dif-
ferences in tax levels between rich and poor countries. Prob-
ably the most obvious explanation is the marked difference
in the capacity to tax among countries at different levels of
economic development. As countries become richer, their
increasing wealth generally is accompanied both by exten-
sive development of the financial structure and by increased
dependence on large, formal organizations as sources of em-
ployment and income for an increasingly large fraction of
the population.5These developments make it easier for gov-
ernments to track, measure, and tax growing income and
wealth. In contrast, a much greater fraction of economic ac-
tivity in developing countries takes place in small-scale ac-
tivities that often are in the so-called informal sector—
hence, outside the organized financial sector and inherently
difficult to tax. 
The main lesson suggested by this line of analysis is that
in order to tax more, a country must be more developed.
Such news is unlikely to be very helpful to developing coun-
tries—not least because they often are simultaneously told
that if they impose higher taxes at the margin on growing
sectors of their economies, they will discourage growth. Tax-
es may come with growth, but even the best tax policy is un-
likely to yield much revenue in the absence of growth. Of
course, if foreign donors step in (or natural-resource bonan-
zas occur), countries may be able to grow without taxing
themselves—and politicians sensitive to their own political
futures usually will be happy to follow such easier paths to
an expanded public sector.
Some writers have suggested that this dilemma is more
apparent than real—that if they choose to do so, even the
poorest countries can tax more than they now do simply by
improving administration and by getting the “politics of tax-
ation” right.6 This advice surely is correct in some ways.
However, it is unlikely to be either easy or simple to imple-
ment. It is not helpful to tell countries wishing to have bigger
(and, one hopes, better) tax systems that they first must be
better countries. A related (though perhaps a bit more en-
couraging) approach in the literature emphasizes not so
much the capacity to tax (that is, the level or structure of
GDP) or the ability to tax (that is, the level of financial de-
velopment) as the willingness to tax (what might be called
the demand side of the fiscal equation). If people want more
public services and trust that their government will try to
deliver such services as effectively and efficiently as possible,
they are more likely to support efforts to raise taxes than
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the way of benefits from increased government activity (as
has happened in too many countries).7 This view implies
that taxes imposed without adequately representing the in-
terests of the people being taxed are unlikely to be collected
easily (and will not be productively spent). Again, the infer-
ence is that better governments can collect more—and,
again one hopes, better—taxes. Although this seems plausi-
ble, and some evidence suggests that it may even be right,
once again it is all too clear that there is no simple road to
better (or bigger) taxation in developing countries.
However one interprets either the empirical story of the
last 50 years or the ideas sketched above, it is clear that the
links between taxation and economic efficiency—like those
between economic efficiency and economic growth—are
difficult to tease out and to understand either in general or
for any particular country. Thus, it seldom is easy to draw
clear policy implications from the literature for any particu-
lar country at any particular time. To illustrate, it is rare that
much policy discussion of taxation adequately considers the
distributional or stabilization dimensions of the fiscal prob-
lem; instead, discussion focuses mainly on efficiency con-
cerns, even though policy makers almost invariably operate
in environments in which distributional, stabilization, and
political considerations dominate. 
Even  leaving  such  considerations  aside,  perhaps  the
strongest and most relevant policy conclusion one can draw
from an examination of the extensive empirical and theoret-
ical literature on the links between taxation and economic
development is simply that we do not yet understand much
about this issue in general.8 Nonetheless, the literature does
support a number of specific policy suggestions (discussed
below) that many developing countries would do well to
take into account in designing and implementing their tax
systems. 
Lessons for Developing Countries
Optimal tax theory is a useful and clarifying approach in
many ways; but, for a number of reasons, it seldom offers
clear lessons for tax policy makers. As an example, it is often
true that only a small subset of available taxes is considered,
and such important real-world phenomena as market fail-
ures and regulatory policy are left out of account. Moreover,
the revenue requirement usually is taken as given (ignoring
what it is to be spent on), administrative constraints and
transaction costs typically are left out of account, and most
potentially relevant nonrevenue objectives and the effects of
differences between the public interest and the private in-
terests of those charged with carrying out public policy are
ignored. 
Perhaps the main practical policy implication of optimal
tax theory is that production efficiency matters: in particular,
it is bad to tax intermediate goods used in production be-
cause it distorts resource allocation—one reason most econ-
omists generally have favored value added taxation. It is un-
fortunate that this important point has proved hard to
market to citizens and to politicians focused much more on
the immediate distributional impact of policy changes than
on their long-run implications for efficiency, investment, and
growth.
In practice, policy advisers probably rely less on theory
than on rules of thumb closer to Adam Smith’s famous
canons of taxation—certainty, simplicity and convenience,
and economy. For example,
• The BBLR approach mentioned earlier is such a rule
of thumb: taxes should have broad bases and low rates
to minimize negative economic effects on prices and
to reduce the potential for administrative corruption
and tax evasion. 
• An important corollary of the BBLR proposition is to
minimize tax concessions—although this advice often
seems to be more honored in the breach than in the
observance (perhaps because of the enduring political
attractiveness of tax favoritism). 
• Another common prescription intended largely to dis-
courage corruption and evasion is for fewer rates of tax
to reduce the problems arising with differentiated tax
rates. 
• Yet another prescription intended to improve the con-
venience and simplicity of the taxes facing unsophisticat-
ed or poorly educated taxpayers is the use of simple
and often “presumptive” (estimated) taxes—although
this approach needs to be handled with great care to
avoid doing harm. 
• Taxes on international trade should be reduced because
they distort allocation of resources in line with com-
parative advantage. A possible exception to this rule
might apply for some least-developed countries where
ease of collecting taxes at the border may dominate. 
• Revenues from income taxes are buoyant; indeed, two
reasons that countries traditionally were advised to rely
more  on  income  tax  with  economic  development
were that taxes would more closely reflect citizens’
ability to pay and that revenue would be more income
elastic. Even those people who think that distribution
is primarily the task of the expenditure rather than the
revenue side of the budget would do well to keep in
mind the elastic nature of the income tax. Indeed, gov-
ernments presumably should be interested in both the
elastic and the progressive characteristics of the in-
come tax—the first to finance expanding expenditures
and the second to increase the degree of perceived fair-
ness and trust in government.
No doubt many other useful lessons may be derived in
principle from the substantial literature on tax theory and
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lessons have been tested in the context of developing coun-
tries, partly because most critical issues depend on elasticities
about which we usually know far less than we need to design
good tax policy. Consider some common tax policy design
issues that come up again and again in developing countries:
• Should income taxes be progressive, flat, dual (or
schedular), or nonexistent? 
• Should foreign source income be taxed—and if so,
how?
• Should indirect taxes be imposed at uniform or at dif-
ferentiated rates?
• If differentiated, how should externalities (and regula-
tory policies) be taken into account?
• Should small businesses be taxed differently from large
businesses—and if so, how?
• What taxes should be assigned to different levels of
government?
• Should taxes be lighter or heavier on “growing” sectors
of the economy?
• How should (and can) the “informal” sector be taxed
more effectively?
No simple or general applicable answers to any of these
questions are available-or, in some cases, even conceivable.
Nonetheless, as implied by the earlier list of rules of thumb,
experience and the literature do suggest a number of ways
in which these and other policy issues can be (and have
been) explored in detail in the circumstances of particular
countries.
Keys to Successful Tax Reform
The economic literature on taxation and development fo-
cuses on taxation as a policy instrument. However, it seldom
does so in the context of the policy process. In practice, the
process may largely determine the product in two important
senses9: 
1. Tax administration matters—a lot! The best tax policy
ineffectively  administered  amounts  to  nothing  (see
PREM Note 156). Conversely, the revenue administra-
tion will, in effect, produce its own “policy product,”
even if there is no coherent or “designed” policy, In
short, policy outcomes depend very much on how poli-
cies are administered. Thus, critical aspects of tax ad-
ministration need more research and must be integrated
more closely with tax policy work, Among the ques-
tions to be studied are these: How much should be
spent on administration? How should tax administra-
tion be organized and run? How can countries deal with
the “hard-to-tax” populations (both rich and poor)? 
2. More important, taxation is about politics, just as pol-
itics is partly about taxation—especially its perceived
distributional effect. In addition to considering in more
detail how tax policy and administration may affect
the building of social capital (for good or ill), more at-
tention needs to be paid to other “political” aspects of
tax policy in developing countries—for example, how
to sell taxes to an always-unwilling public. Good mar-
keting is at least as important for successful tax reform
as is good policy design. For example, one way to mar-
ket policy changes may be to use fiscal illusion to fool
people about what really is being done. An opposite
tack may be to stress the increased visibility and ac-
countability of policy actions. (As discussed in PREM
Note 157, this may be one reason to support a degree
of taxation decentralization in some countries.) Anoth-
er possible marketing approach may be to explore or
exploit to an extent the “sales potential” of earmark-
ing—that is, the real or symbolic establishment of links
between taxes and expenditures. Again, decentraliza-
tion may provide an example in some circumstances. 
To mention such approaches is certainly not to recom-
mend them. Nonetheless, such ideas call for more attention
in the literature on “taxing for development” than they have
received. Similarly, politicians matter, as does the immediate
political environment. There is not, probably cannot, and
perhaps should not be anything like a “politician-proof pol-
icy.” Tax policy reform requires a viable and politically rele-
vant champion who owns the reform and can sell it. Packag-
ing also matters. Selling reform depends not only on the
contents of the policy package, but also on how it is present-
ed. This is true because perception is reality to a considerable
extent in the world of politics. Without visible benefits to
offset the visible costs of taxation, new tax policies are un-
likely to be accepted (even if they are technically better than
the policies they replace). Finally, details matter. The fate of
a policy may turn on how some particular group perceives
its interests to be affected or on the precise sequencing and
scope of reform. 
Conclusion
From the perspective of international institutions concerned
with improving tax outcomes in developing countries, this
note suggests two general conclusions:
1. One must know the context well to be sure that one is
recommending the right product and that one under-
stands the right way to get to “there” from “here.” Do-
ing so requires a clear analytical model, and demands
that the issues in each country be approached in light
of a thorough understanding of the path-dependent
and context-specific conditions within which policy
initiatives are introduced and implemented. It also re-
quires one to pay close attention to relevant local con-
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ceived norms, and so forth; and to be able and willing
to produce fact- and logic-based analysis in a form that
can enter the relevant political-bureaucratic discus-
sion. In many instances, what this suggests is that inter-
national institutions should support both official and
(perhaps especially) nonofficial local research and dis-
semination efforts rather than attempting to do the
work themselves.
2. Always be mindful of the no-one-size-fits-all principle.
There is no magic blueprint—no tax system, structure,
or particular policy that makes sense for all countries
at all times. Realizing that, from the government’s per-
spective, taxes are only one of a set of “governing in-
struments,” it is critical in designing and evaluating tax
policy to take carefully into account the design, admin-
istration, and consequences of such other government
activities as those related to nontax revenues, expendi-
tures, and regulations. 
Designing and implementing a viable and sustainable tax
strategy for development in a developing country is a diffi-
cult and time-consuming task. But it can be done—and has
been  done,  as  countries  from  Chile  to  Singapore  have
shown—when countries really want to do so; take the lead
themselves; and obtain the technical, institutional, and per-
haps even financial support that may be required.
Notes
1. A comprehensive income tax is levied on net income
from all sources according to the same rate schedule.
2. For a review of both the basic theory of optimal taxa-
tion and the earlier empirical evidence mentioned, see Auer-
bach and Feldstein (1985).
3. For example, policies recommended in World Bank
(1991).
4. For a detailed examination of the effects of VAT on rev-
enue, see Keen and Lockwood (2010).
5. Gordon and Li (2009) provide a useful exploration of
this issue. 
6. As an example, the UN Millennium Project (2005)
notes that, on average, developing countries needed to mo-
bilize “only” an additional 4 percent of GDP in tax revenue
to obtain the revenues needed to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals. It appears to assume that any develop-
ing country worth its salt reasonably could be expected to
increase its current tax take by the required 22 percent—or
almost three times more than such countries had managed
over the previous three decades. 
7. A useful and concise statement of this argument is pro-
vided by Moore (2007). Its empirical basis is explored to
some extent in Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler (2008). 
8. For extensive reviews of the empirical and theoretical
underpinnings of this statement (in developed countries),
see Johansson et al. (2008) and Myles (2009). 
9. A stimulating discussion of this issue in the context of
Latin America may be found in IDB (2006). 
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